POURQUOI LES GENS SONT-ILS DE PLUS EN PLUS ÉGOÏSTES ?

In this transcript, sociologist Camille Peugny explores the profound transformation of French society over the last forty years, specifically focusing on the rise of what he terms "selfish" behaviors. He clarifies that this is not a moral judgment but a sociological observation of how social constraints force individuals to adopt strategies that maximize their own interests, even when they know such actions might harm social cohesion. This shift is deeply rooted in the process of neoliberalization, affecting both the upper-middle class and the working class in distinct, yet equally significant, ways. Peugny begins by analyzing the ideological shift of the upper-middle class. Forty years ago, this demographic—comprised of young, educated professionals—was characterized by a "turn to the left." They supported traditional labor values like the right to strike and nationalization, while also embracing cultural liberalism, such as women’s rights and environmentalism. This synthesis made them the core electorate for leaders like François Mitterrand in 1981. However, Peugny argues that today, this group has taken a "rightward turn." While they acknowledge that inequalities are increasing, their interpretation of the cause has changed fundamentally. In the past, they attributed success or failure to social circumstances or the "luck of birth." Today, they overwhelmingly view inequality through the lens of individual merit. This "individualizing grid" suggests that everyone is responsible for their own path; those who succeed deserve it, and those who fail have only themselves to blame. This shift has massive implications because the upper-middle class holds significant political power. They vote at much higher rates than the working class, meaning their lean toward neoliberal principles disproportionately shapes electoral outcomes. Furthermore, following the theories of Georg Simmel, Peugny explains that the middle class acts as a social "interface." Because they interact with all levels of the social structure, their values and analysis of society tend to diffuse and become the dominant cultural norm. This mindset is reinforced by modern education; business schools and universities now heavily promote a culture of entrepreneurship and individual success, further embedding these neoliberal logics in the next generation of leaders. The transcript then transitions into the changing role of the State, referencing the work of David Harvey. Neoliberalization does not mean the disappearance of the State, but rather a reorientation of its purpose. Instead of acting as a "national pilot" that balances economic growth with social cohesion—as it did during the post-war "Trente Glorieuses"—the State now focuses on maintaining a climate favorable to business and competitiveness. This involves opening previously protected sectors like health and education to market competition and "New Public Management." Peugny uses the university system as an example, noting how the focus has shifted toward generating profit and administrative efficiency. This has led to a reduction in permanent faculty positions in favor of precarious, underpaid temporary staff. When public services treat "users" as "clients," it fosters an instrumental relationship that further fuels individualism. For the working class, the experience of individualization is very different; Peugny describes it as "individualization by default." Rather than an ideological choice, it is a survival strategy. He introduces the concept that the working class are now "auto-entrepreneurs of their own precariousness." Through his research on domestic cleaners, he found that the traditional concept of the "salariat" (stable salaried employment) is no longer a reference point. Instead, their lives are a fragmented succession of short-term contracts, periods of unemployment, and informal work. In this context, what looks like a lack of effort from above is actually a form of "minimal insurance" from below. As the social state retreats, individuals must "self-insure" using whatever scraps of the welfare system remain, such as temporary unemployment benefits or local solidarity networks. This creates a short-term economic logic where, for example, working off-the-books might seem beneficial today but leads to poverty in old age. Unlike the upper-middle class, the working class still holds a strong desire for collective protection and public solidarity, but they are increasingly forced into individualistic survival modes because the old collective structures have vanished. A critical factor in this shift is the disappearance of collective work environments. In the past, factory work provided a strong sense of community and a base for unionization and left-wing politicization. Today, the fastest-growing jobs—such as home care, cleaning, and delivery services—are performed in isolation. Workers may go weeks without meeting a colleague. This isolation, combined with "Uberization" and complex subcontracting chains, dilutes the chain of responsibility and makes collective mobilization nearly impossible. Peugny concludes that the weakening of these work collectives is a major dynamic of recent decades, undermining the potential for social movements and fundamentally altering the ideological landscape of the working class. Ultimately, the rise of individualism is not a choice, but a structural consequence of a society that has abandoned collective regulation in favor of market logic.