The Forgotten Branch of Islam | Ibadism

This video introduces Ibadism, a branch of Islam distinct from Sunni and Shia traditions, which emerged from the same 7th-century political and theological crisis that initially split Islam. Ibadis, who call themselves "the people of truth and integrity," have faced persecution, exile, and at times, have operated in secret. Despite their history of being hunted, they are now the majority religion in a modern Middle Eastern country, Oman, which is known for its diplomatic neutrality and quiet brokering of peace deals, such as between the United States and Iran, and hostage negotiations in Yemen. Oman has even hosted Israeli Prime Ministers discreetly. The story of Ibadism begins in 657 AD, during the first Islamic civil war, or "fitna," approximately 25 years after the Prophet Muhammad's death. This conflict pitted Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet's cousin, son-in-law, and fourth caliph (and rightful successor in later Shia tradition), against Muawiyah, the powerful governor of Syria. Their armies met at the Battle of Siffin. As Ali was nearing victory, Muawiyah's forces raised copies of the Quran on their spears, signaling a desire for arbitration based on Allah's word. Ali agreed, but a faction of his army, believing Allah had already decreed their victory, rebelled. Their slogan became "no judgment but Allah's," and they walked out of Ali's camp, earning them the name "Khawarijites" (the ones who walk out or seceders). In modern Muslim discourse, "Khawarijite" is often a pejorative term for extremists. However, the Ibadis are a group that later broke away from this extremism, aiming for a middle ground. Ali decisively defeated the Khawarijites at the Battle of Nahrawan in 658 AD. A few years later, Khawarijite sympathizers assassinated Ali, pushing the early Muslim community towards the Sunni-Shia divide. The Khawarijites did not disappear but splintered. One faction became violent and nomadic, declaring death to anyone not part of their movement. The other faction, the progenitors of Ibadism, took a different path: purposeful disappearance, going "underground." In Basra, a group of moderate survivors found a scholar named Jabir ibn Zayd, born in Oman, who understood the importance of outsmarting the enemy when losing. Jabir, working quietly as a mufti (Islamic legal expert), became the spiritual heir of this moderate rebel group. With his student Abdullah ibn Ibad, from whom the movement takes its name, they rejected the extreme positions of the early Khawarij. They agreed Ali was wrong to accept arbitration and that the community should be led by the most pious and learned, not a hereditary monarch. Crucially, they rejected the radical Khawarijite belief that any Muslim not in their movement was an idolater deserving death. The Ibadi founders instead called non-Ibadi Muslims "kuffar ni'ma," or ingrates—people who failed to be properly grateful for God's blessing but were still monotheists within Islam. This meant they should be held at a spiritual distance, not killed or fought. This distinction was a pivotal theological move. The movement, named after Abdullah ibn Ibad, eventually called themselves the "Ahl al-Istiqaamah" (people of truth and integrity). From Basra, the Ibadi network spread through trade routes and underground study circles. When the Umayyad dynasty, the Sunni rulers, cracked down, the Ibadis again disappeared, fleeing in two main directions: east to the mountains of Oman (Jabir ibn Zayd's birthplace) and west across North Africa to Berber tribes in modern-day Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria, and later to Zanzibar. In these isolated regions, Ibadis stopped running and built their own states, laws, and scholarly traditions, quietly outlasting the empires that had persecuted them. This community, once invisible, became indestructible. Ibadism outwardly resembles mainstream Sunni Islam, with similar prayers, fasting, Hajj, and the same holy book. However, classical Ibadi scholars held theological positions for centuries that both Sunni and Shia mainstreams rejected. These differences, while sometimes subtle, fundamentally reshape their view of God, salvation, and community. First, regarding the Quran, mainstream Sunni theology holds it as the eternal, uncreated word of God. Classical Ibadi theologians, however, believe the Quran is God's speech and authoritative, but it was *created* by God at a particular point, not co-eternal with Him. This was a massive controversy in Islamic history, where the rational Mu'tazila school, which held a similar view, was crushed by traditional Sunni scholars. Ibadis quietly preserved a version of this idea. Second, Ibadis believe that God will never be seen, neither in this life, the afterlife, nor on the Day of Judgment. Mainstream Sunni theology teaches that the blessed in paradise will see Allah directly (the beatific vision). Ibadis reject this, asserting that God is not physical, has no form, and cannot be perceived by human senses. Any Quranic verses describing God with hands or a face are considered metaphorical. Third, classical Ibadi theology has historically been stricter on eternal punishment. Sunni Islam generally teaches that even a very bad Muslim will eventually leave hell after purification, often through the Prophet's intercession. Classical Ibadi theology does not guarantee intercession, taking verses about eternal hellfire literally. While contemporary preachers may soften this, the tradition's historical stance has been much stricter. The most distinctive Ibadi doctrine is "walaya and baraya" (affiliation and disassociation). This requires believers to actively love and associate with those on the true path and actively disassociate from those who are not. Importantly, disassociation for Ibadis does not mean hostility or violence; it's an internal, spiritual posture, withholding the special bond of religious brotherhood from those perceived to have strayed. Historically, many classical Ibadi scholars considered only Ibadis to be fully on the straight path, viewing Sunnis and Shias as "ingrates" – within Islam but spiritually ungrateful. However, modern Ibadi leaders, particularly Oman's current Grand Mufti, Sheikh Ahmad bin Hamad al-Khalili, have softened this, stating that differences are secondary and Muslim unity is paramount. Today in Oman, Sunnis, Shias, and Ibadis pray together. There are also small ritual differences: Ibadis pray with hands at their sides (not folded), do not say "amen" aloud after the opening chapter of the Quran, and end prayers with a single peace greeting instead of two. These details highlight a distinctive religious culture that developed in isolation. Ibadis also developed a unique framework for surviving persecution, known as the "Masalik ad-Din" (states of the religion), which outlines four operational models for a Muslim community based on its freedom and power. 1. **Zuhur (Manifestation):** Open-air mode with a free, independent Islamic government and an openly ruling, elected Imam who enforces Islamic law. 2. **Difa (Defense):** Fortress mode when the community is under attack. A special Imam al-Difa (military commander) is elected with full authority for the war's duration, his status dissolving afterwards. 3. **Shira (Selling):** The martyr vanguard. A group of at least 40 Muslims voluntarily "sell their lives to God" by launching an uprising against an unjust ruler, even if it means death, to keep righteous resistance alive. 4. **Kitman (Secrecy):** The underground mode. The religion continues, but completely out of public view. This state is entered when open practice is impossible due to heavy persecution or when resistance is futile. Believers hide their faith and practice prudent dissimulation to survive. The community is led by an Imam al-Kitman (Imam of secrecy), a scholar whose authority is recognized privately by the faithful, guiding the community spiritually but never openly, awaiting changed conditions. Kitman can last for years or centuries. The North African Ibadi community, for example, entered Kitman in 909 AD after their last independent state, the Rustamid Imamate in Algeria, was destroyed by the Shia Fatimid dynasty. Some scholars interpret this as a concrete institution with a real person known to a secret inner circle, while others say councils of elders (Azaba) collectively fill this role. In modern North Africa, community councils and scholars are more common than a single hidden Imam. This institutionalized concept of being hidden in plain sight is central to Ibadism. After the Rustamid Imamate fell, North African Ibadis scattered. Some went to the Nafusa Mountains of Libya, some to Jerba island off Tunisia, and others to the M'zab Valley in southern Algeria, where they built fortified cities like those in the M'zab, starting in the 11th century. These vertical, walled towns with white and pink houses, underground water systems, and palm groves were designed for survival in a harsh landscape. At the center of each city was a simple, unadorned mosque. Inside, the Azaba councils judged disputes, collected taxes, ran schools, and preserved libraries of Ibadi manuscripts. For centuries, Mzab was a guarded religious enclave, often forbidding outsiders, even other Muslims, from their mosques or inner quarters, and discouraging intermarriage. This isolation preserved their faith, unique manuscripts, and scholarly traditions. In recent decades, Mzab has become a zone of tension, with clashes between Ibadi Berber communities and incoming Sunni Arab populations. In Libya, Ibadi communities in Nafusa and Zuara faced suppression under Gaddafi's forced Arab nationalism. After his fall in 2011, they reasserted their identity, openly displaying religious symbols, publishing texts, and reopening scholarly networks. On the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, in Oman, Ibadis ran their own state. The last elected Imam of Oman took office in 1954. This Ibadi Imamate, governed by classical Islamic law, was a functioning sovereign political entity in the modern era. In 1954, British-backed Sultan Said bin Taimur of Muscat and Oman granted oil exploration rights in the interior, which was Ibadi Imam Ghalib al-Hinai's territory. Imam Ghalib resisted, leading to the War of the Green Mountain (1954-1959). The Ibadis initially won, but Britain intervened directly with the Royal Air Force, bombing Ibadi villages and irrigation systems (a potential war crime) to break their resistance. British commandos ultimately scaled a mountain to surprise the defenders, ending the war. Imam Ghalib fled to Saudi Arabia, appealing to the UN for recognition that never came, and died in 2009. Many traditionalists consider him the last legitimate elected Imam. The Sultan, Said bin Taimur, became a paranoid autocrat, banning cars, paved roads, and international travel for his subjects. In 1970, his son, Qaboos, staged a coup. Qaboos ruled for 50 years, until 2020, building a new, strategically positioned, neutral, and useful state. Britain's intervention, intended to resolve the "Oman question," inadvertently cleared the path for the most powerful and quiet Ibadi state ever. Oman's foreign policy, often called the "Muscat Channel," is a crucial backchannel diplomatic mechanism in the Middle East. It facilitated secret meetings between American and Iranian officials for years before the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). Oman is the only Gulf Cooperation Council country with cordial relations with Iran since 1979, and the only Gulf state that didn't join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. It has hosted Israeli Prime Ministers while maintaining ties with Iran and Palestinian groups. Sultan Qaboos's foreign policy is summarized as "friend to all, enemy to none." This strategic neutrality is rooted in Ibadism's unique position. Being neither Sunni nor Shia, Ibadism sits outside the main sectarian axis of the Middle East, allowing Oman to mediate without appearing biased. The doctrine of walaya and bara'a, with its principled non-hostile disassociation, shaped a culture of conservatism and self-preservation without grandstanding as the "one true version of Islam." The same reflex that advised Ibadis to avoid provoking empires and to keep their heads down now guides Oman's foreign policy: stay calm, stay neutral, and be open to working with anyone. This "strategic quietism" is essentially the Kitman (the fourth state of the religion) translated into foreign policy—a calculated decision to remain neutral and allow others to approach them, to disappear from headlines and avoid credit. Ibad