La Chine prend le plus grand gisement de gaz — et l'Europe réalise son erreur

European countries are seeing American gas deliveries diverted to Asian markets. Since the war in Iran began, 10% of LNG tankers bound for Europe have been rerouted to China and India. These two nations rely heavily on Qatar, which supplies 30% and 59% of their liquefied natural gas consumption, respectively. Overall, 90% of the LNG leaving the Persian Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz is directed towards Asia. This shift is not merely an energy issue but a geopolitical one. While Europe observes escalating gas markets and increasingly uncertain energy flows, a strategic development has occurred in Central Asia that could reshape the energy balance for the next decade. This began with a significant maritime crisis when the Strait of Hormuz faced missile attack threats, prompting immediate reactions from shipowners. Vessels gradually stopped using this strategic route, a vital artery for global energy trade. As traffic collapsed, the impact quickly spread, causing natural gas flows to Europe and Asia to plummet. Markets reacted violently, with European gas prices already up by about 90%. Analysts warn that if the strait remains disrupted for a few more weeks, prices could exceed €100 per MWh. This risk of scarcity caused the price difference between Asian and European LNG to quintuple in ten days, leading American charterers to send their cargo to Asia rather than Europe. Amid this global search for new supplies, another strategic dynamic has quietly emerged. On March 21, China and Turkmenistan announced a surprising agreement: a Chinese company will now develop Turkmenistan's largest gas field, with an annual capacity of approximately 10 billion cubic meters exclusively for the Chinese market. Turkmenistan, though often overlooked in geopolitical analyses, holds immense energy resources, ranking fourth globally for proven natural gas reserves after Russia, Iran, and Qatar. Its oil reserves exceed 20 billion tons, and natural gas reserves are over 50 trillion cubic meters. In 2025, the country's total gas production surpassed 76.5 billion cubic meters, and oil production reached over 8.3 million tons. Despite these colossal figures, Turkmenistan faces a major structural obstacle: it is landlocked, with no direct access to the sea. Since about 80% of international energy trade relies on maritime transport, Turkmenistan must depend on corridors through neighboring states to export its resources, limiting its maneuverability and exposing it to political and logistical constraints. It is in this context that cooperation with China became strategic. In 2006, Beijing and Ashgabat signed a gas supply agreement, accompanied by the massive Central Asia-China gas pipeline project, which officially began operations in December 2009 and remains fully operational. Lines A, B, and C of the pipeline allow Turkmenistan to export about 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year to China, making it Beijing's primary source of pipeline gas imports. This cooperation has now entered a new phase. On March 18, the former Turkmen president visited China for crucial diplomatic talks, coinciding with the 18th day of the Hormuz crisis, an attack on the South Pars gas field, disruptions to Qatari LNG exports, and soaring global markets. In this climate of extreme uncertainty, Beijing accelerated negotiations. China secured an additional delivery commitment for the next 20 years and maintained favorable pricing conditions. Thus, while international prices surged, China secured long-term, stable, and lower-cost supplies. A few days later, an even more significant agreement was signed: China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China's largest oil and gas group, will develop Turkmenistan's largest gas field, adding about 10 billion cubic meters of annual production. Discovered in 2006, this field holds approximately 27 trillion cubic meters of gas, making it one of the largest on the planet. CNPC will handle drilling, infrastructure construction, and production system development. The decision to entrust this massive project to China rather than Western companies stems from China being Turkmenistan's most stable and pragmatic partner. Neighboring countries don't need additional volumes, and exporting to Europe involves long, multi-state maritime routes susceptible to many uncertainties. Given these conditions, entrusting the development of the country's largest field to a partner capable of financing, building, and immediately purchasing the gas became a logical decision. This energy choice raises a deeper strategic question: if Beijing consolidates its direct access to Central Asian resources while Europe continues to rely on unstable maritime markets, who will truly control future energy flows? And does this mark the beginning of a lasting energy shift from Europe to Asia? This agreement goes beyond mere field development; it establishes a comprehensive energy architecture where CNPC controls almost the entire chain—field development, gas processing, pipeline transport, and commercialization—greatly simplifying Turkmenistan's export model and securing its revenues long-term. This partnership is central to China's energy security. In an international crisis, especially if US-Iran tensions intensify or the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted, maritime routes become unstable. The China-Turkmenistan pipeline operates independently of these routes and can supply 65 billion cubic meters of gas annually, enough for over 500 million people. With a guaranteed 20-year agreement, China further enhances this security. Russia supplies an additional 38.8 billion cubic meters annually, bringing pipeline imports to nearly 100 billion cubic meters. This contrasts with Japan, which has few resources and relies on maritime imports. When Middle East flows are disrupted, Tokyo must increase coal and nuclear use, while the falling yen and rising oil prices reduce energy purchasing power. On March 11, Japan released 80 million barrels from its strategic reserves, with South Korea facing a similar situation. For Turkmenistan, the agreement extends beyond gas sales, strengthening military cooperation with Beijing through equipment like the JB Quaki 27 radar, SH 4 drones, Mengchu armored vehicles, and the Jan 1101 anti-drone system. Over 80% of Turkmen gas is exported to China, generating about $10 billion in trade surplus, and the new project is expected to create thousands of jobs. Meanwhile, Europe is grappling with the energy crisis. Gas prices reached €60 per MWh, with peaks at €70, compared to €30 in late February, as Middle East tensions nearly doubled prices in a week. The EU now heavily relies on imported LNG, with about 58% of its March imports coming from the United States. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Brussels has drastically reduced Russian gas purchases, with Russian oil accounting for only about 1% of total EU imports by the end of 2025. Amid the global energy crisis, analysts suggest past decisions have made Europe more vulnerable to market fluctuations. As gas prices rise and electricity and heating bills climb for households, governments attempt to mitigate the impact with subsidies and tax cuts, like Spain's €5 billion effort. However, a deeper question is emerging in European energy debates: if geopolitical crises continue to disrupt maritime routes and new energy resources increasingly shift towards Asia, will Europe lose its ability to secure stable long-term supplies? And in this new global energy competition, is the true center of gravity for natural gas definitively shifting towards Asia?