Y a-t-il un vote religieux en France ?

The discussion centers on the book "Vote religieux, un tabou français" by L. Jakubowicz, a political journalist specializing in electoral behavior and editor-in-chief of "Décideurs Magazine." The book tackles the sensitive subject of religious voting in France, exploring how identity and cultural criteria influence electoral outcomes, despite France's prohibition on official religious statistics. Jakubowicz highlights that while this is a taboo in France, it is not in many other countries, such as the United States, where candidates directly address voters based on race, national origin, and religion, a practice known as communitarianism. In France, however, the political myth of a universalist, secular republic means religion is theoretically absent from elections. Jakubowicz anticipated being labeled negatively for addressing this topic, acknowledging the risk of attacking established political narratives. However, he clarifies that his work is not about judging religious voting as good or bad, but rather presenting it as a fact and analyzing all major political parties and the three main monotheistic religions. Despite the lack of official statistics, he utilized data from polling institutes like Ifop, which have been measuring confessional voting for about twenty years, to provide a national overview. He emphasizes that religious practice plays a central role in electoral choice, sometimes even more significantly than other variables like age, education level, or place of residence. The book begins by examining the Jewish vote, noting a shift away from the left, which started around 2001 with the Second Intifada. This period saw a rise in antisemitic acts, which, coming from the left and suburbs, was perceived as a new form of antisemitism. The socialist government at the time was criticized for downplaying these concerns, leading many French Jews to feel abandoned and to increasingly lean towards the right. The events of October 7th further solidified this shift. Jakubowicz points out that while the Jewish vote is numerically small in France, the perception of a party as antisemitic is a significant deterrent for a broader electorate. Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Rally (RN), has actively pursued a "de-demonization" strategy since 2015, presenting herself as a protector of French Jews. The October 7th events allowed her to further shed the antisemitic stigma associated with the RN's origins, with some members of the Jewish community acknowledging that "there are worse" than her. The discussion then moves to La France Insoumise (LFI) and its strategy to attract the Muslim vote, marking a significant shift after 2017. Jakubowicz identifies the November 2019 demonstration against Islamophobia as a turning point, where LFI elected officials participated and recognized the term "Islamophobia," unlike other left-wing parties. He notes a change in Jean-Luc Mélenchon's stance on the veil, evolving from viewing it as a form of submission to a more accommodating position. This strategic shift suggests that LFI may have abandoned a purely social discourse in favor of a community-based approach. While LFI's strong performance in areas like Seine-Saint-Denis could be attributed to it being one of France's poorest departments, Jakubowicz argues against a simple class-based vote. He contrasts the voting patterns in these areas, where many poor residents of Muslim faith and origin vote for Mélenchon, with similar socio-economic groups in "white" departments (like Aisne, Haute-Saône, Ardennes), where Marine Le Pen achieves her highest results. This suggests that identity, rather than just social class, plays a crucial role. Regarding the Catholic vote, Jakubowicz states that it can be summarized as "RAS" (Rien A Signaler - nothing to report), indicating little change over two centuries. Catholics are predominantly found in specific regions of western France, and their vote remains stable, leaning towards the center, center-right, and center-left. Unlike Jewish or Muslim communities, appeals based on antisemitism or Islamophobia do not resonate with Catholic voters in the same way. However, he notes that the RN is increasingly making inroads in Catholic areas. In conclusion, Jakubowicz asserts that France is no longer a secular and universalist republic, implying that the observed religious voting patterns will continue and likely intensify in future presidential elections, with Catholics increasingly leaning towards the RN.